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Abstract 
 
 PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member 
countries.  Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors’ welfare?  In a two-good competitive 
equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will 
hurt the outsider’s welfare when goods are normal.  If one of the member countries is an 
entrepôt, however, it definitely improves the neighbors’ welfare.  In a multiple-good model, a 
PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors’ welfare, provided that all the goods are 
normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The world is in a mode of negotiating preferential trade agreements. A preferential 
trade agreement (PTA) certainly creates trade flows among its members, but it often 
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Pareto improving PTA could be created. 
diverts trade ows from non-member countries. The Most Favored Nation (MFN)
principle is the cornerstone for the General Agreement for Tari¤s and Trade (GATT).
GATT Article XXIV, or at least its current interpretation, o¤ers a "loophole" for the
countries that participate in a PTA formation. Can a PTA become benecial to
the rest of the world even though no concessions are made in tari¤s or transfers?
This paper shows that under a reasonable set of conditions, the formation of a PTA
deteriorates the welfare of the neighboring countries unless some concessions are made
for the neighboring countries.
Our paper is concerned with the welfare of those countries that are left behind
as a result of bilateral liberalization movements. Our curiosity is piqued by the
observation in reality that a PTA is seldom, or possibly never, negotiated with a
clause that allows concessions to the rest of the world. Legally, as an exception
to the MFN rule of GATT, GATT allowed a form of tari¤ reduction among PTA
countries provided only that the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed
at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations
of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such
union or the adoption of such interim agreement.(GATT Article XXIV, Section 5).
As we will see below, the article, or at least the current interpretation of it, falls far
short of providing necessary procedures to keep the welfare of nonmember countries
from being hurt by the formation of a PTA.
It is well known through the famous Kemp-Wan theorem (Kemp and Wan, 1976)
that a PTA can benet neighbors as long as tari¤concessions or transfers are provided
for neighbor countries. In view of the general practice of creating a PTA without com-
pensating outsiders, however, we regard it as a crucial as well as legitimate question
to inquire under what conditions a PTA can ever benet neighbors?
We answer this question mathematically by appleaing to the expenditure-revenue
function approach in a general equilibrium competitive model of trade. In a two-
commodity formulation where both goods are normal, we show that a Pareto im-
proving PTA is impossible without external tari¤ concessions to the rest of the world,
unless one of the member countries is an "entrepôt." If one of the member countries
is an entrepôt, however, formation of a PTA without concessions to the rest of the
world denitely improves the welfare of the rest of the world. In other words, in the
presence of an entrepôt in the PTA, a formation of a PTA is always Pareto-improving
to the world as a whole.
In a general multi-commodity, multi-country models with the Armington assump-
tion that a good is the export of only one country (of origin), if all the goods are nor-
mal and substitutes, and if initial tari¤ levels are small, then a PTA that is negotiated
and mutually benecial for the member countries without compensation to outsiders
will necessarily hurt the welfare of outsiders. These conclusions hold even if we allow
intra-member transfers between members of a PTA. Incidentally, if countries in the
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world adopt the scheme of Bhagwati-Ramasuwami-Srinivasan policy interventions to
correct domestic distortions, then the mutually welfare improving tari¤ reductions
without concessions to outsiders will denitely deteriorate the welfare of outsiders,
regardless of whether the commodities are mutual substitutes or complements.
Curiously, the conclusion for a two-commodity model is reversed in the presence of
the "entrepôt." If one of the members is an "entrepôt," then the formation of a PTA
will always be welfare enhancing to the neighboring countries and accordingly Pareto-
improving to the world. Recently, we see the emergence of prosperous transient ports
such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Panama and others, making the best use of their
advantageous geographical locations and extensive port facilities. These countries
bring trade goods for import and export, and for collection and distribution, inter-
nationally. Also we see that those entrepôt countries have very often participated in
PTAs themselves or are in the process of negotiating PTAs. There are indeed many
reasons that those entrepôt countries tend to negotiate for a member of a PTA, but,
one of the reasons may be that a PTA involving an entrepôt is Pareto-improving for
the world.
After a short sketch of traditional literature on the welfare e¤ect of a PTA in Sec-
tion 2, we will present a model based on the expenditure-revenue function and derive
the propositions for the di¢ culty of a Pareto-improving PTA without an entrepôt
in Section 3. The welfare enhancing aspect of a PTA involving an entrepôt will be
discussed in Section 4. We will discuss the extention of this model to a multiple com-
modity case by examining its three-good, three-country version in Section 5. Finally,
in Section 6, we show the absolute impossibility of forming a Pareto-improving PTA
in a world economy where domestic distortions were corrected by proper tax-subsidy
schemes (Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan
(1969)), which we call the BRS scheme. The last section concludes the discussions.
2 Bibliographic Sketch
Jacob Viner (1950) originated the ideas of the trade diversion e¤ect and the trade
creation e¤ect of a custom union. Our question is tantamount to asking whether the
trade diversion e¤ect of a PTA dominates its trade creation e¤ect with respect to the
welfare of neighboring countries. We show that trade diversion is likely to dominate
trade creation towards the rest of the world, and we explore the exact conditions for
the validity of this statement.1
In the empirical domain, Winters and Chang (2000) reported that the Spanish
accession to the EC reduced the prices of export goods from non-partner countries
to Spain relative to those of partners (ECs) exports. Chang and Winters (2002)
also found that the creation of Mercosur was associated with signicant reductions
1Though Viner himself was concerened the welfare e¤ects on the countries participating in an
agreement, but the analogy applies clearly to non-member countries as well.
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in the nonmembersterms of trade. Our paper gives a theoretical reason as to why
the terms of trade of the rest of the world are likely to deteriorate.
In a model that utilizes calculus, Mundell (1964) addressed a similar issue using
the gross-substitutability assumption. The assumption of gross substitutability was
crucial there. The results in our paper, however, indicated that the low levels of initial
tari¤ and the (net) substitutability among goods are more important factors in order
to assess accurately the outside welfare e¤ect of a PTA. This general equilibrium
approach is rened by the use of the expenditure-revenue approach as developed by
Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982), and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983,
1985).
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) analyzed a competitive equilibrium, two-sector model
of the world economy and successfully convinced us of the importance of WTOs le-
gal structure including the MFNs principle. We focus our attention on the economic
impact of a PTA on its neighborswelfare in the absence of compensations to them.
By appealing to the expenditure-revenue function approach, we obtain mathemati-
cally clear-cut answers to those questions. Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b) also
analyzed the important issues involving a multicountry situation like us, but most of
their results in the last two papers were derived from a partial equilibrium approach.
Most of the previous work derives su¢ cient conditions for the formation of a
Pareto-improving PTA for the world. Panagariya and Krishna (2002), and Riezman
and Shimomura (2006) give concrete prescriptions for how to form a Pareto improving
PTA. Most of them, however, require some instruments to give concessions to the rest
of the world; we preclude the possibility of employing them.2
Some of our results demonstrate the impossibility of attaining, under certain con-
ditions, a Pareto improving PTA without concessions to neighboring countries. Kemp
and Wan (1976) proved the possibility of a Pareto-improving customs union using the
constancy of the terms of trade to outside countries. As mentioned above, we showed
the impossibility of a Pareto-improving PTA for the world under the limited avail-
ability of policy instruments. In doing this, using the Kemp-Wan methodology to
look for constant terms-of-trade toward outsiders turned out to be useful in proving
many propositions in our paper. Needless to say, our results do not contradict at all
the celebrated Kemp-Wan theorem because in our paper the instruments necessary
to achieve their results are precluded by hypothesis.
3 Two-good, Three-country Case
To begin, consider a three-country, two-good model, a familiar model extensively
studied by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Country 1 exports Good 1 to Country 2,
Country 2 exports Good 2 to Country 1, and those two countries negotiate mutual
2Bond et. al. (2004) also obtains a welfare improving formation of a PTA under oligopolistic
assumptions on the trade behavior.
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tari¤ reductions. We neglect, for the sake of simplicity, the e¤ects of transportation
costs. Country 0 is the rest of the world in this setting. The trade pattern is important
for the following discussions and will be specied below.
Dene a "Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)" as an agreement between two
countries, or among several countries, to decrease the tari¤s levied on goods imported
from participating countries in the agreement. Strictly speaking, this denition is that
of "interim PTA" because this denition does not require a complete or near removal
of tari¤s as often used in the articles of the GATT. Due to the incremental nature
of our analysis, however, we have to deal primarily with interim PTAs and call it
simply a "preferential trade agreement" throughout this paper.
Denote the specic tari¤ rate imposed on Good j by Country l on the export of
Country k to Country l by tklj : The subscript indicates the kind of commodity, the
double superscripts indicate the direction of trade, and naturally the second letter
indicates the country that imposes the tari¤. Tari¤s are imposed in the form of
"specic tari¤s." Since, at the initial point, Country 1 exports Good 1 to Country 2,
and Country 2 exports Good 2 to Country 1, Country 1 imposes a tari¤ t212 on its
import from Country 2 and Country 2 imposes a tari¤ t121 on its import from Country
1. Those tari¤s are the subject for a negotiation between Country 1 and Country
2 that form a PTA. The specic tari¤ on the export of Country 0 is notated as t0lj
(j = 1 or 2, l = 1 or 2), and the specic tari¤ on the import of Country 0 is tl0j (j = 1
or 2, l = 1 or 2).
Let us posit the basic assumptions of this section as follows:
Assumption I: Transportation costs are negligible.
Assumption IIA: Neither the import nor the export of Country 0 is subject to any
import tari¤s, that is, t0lj = 0, and t
l0
j = 0. Or,
Assumption IIB: At the initial point, all the tari¤ rates of all the countries satisfy
the most favored nation (MFN) principle such that tklj = t
ml
j ; ( j = 1; 2; l = 0; 1; 2;
k 6= m) where the pair kl corresponds to the available import route.
Assumption III: All the goods are normal, that is, the income e¤ects are positive.
Under Assumption I, and Assumption IIA or IIB, both of them seem to be rea-
sonable, the directions of trade ows can be clearly determined. In the absence of
transportation costs (Assumption I), and in the absence of no tari¤s on the trade
of the rest of the world (Assumption IIA), the relative price of Good 2 in terms of
Good 1 in Country 1 is higher than in Country 2 because of the tari¤s on Good 1 by
Country 2, and the tari¤ on Good 2 by Country 1. It is important to notice that the
pattern of world trade will become in the direction either portrayed in Figure 1A or
1B.
<Figure 1A and Figure 1B come here>
Remark I. Under Assumption I and IIA, if Country 0 exports Good 2 and imports
Good 1, then it will do so only to and from Country 1. In this case (let us call it
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Case A), the prices of Country 0 are equal to those in Country 1. There are no trade
ows between Country 0 and Country 2.
On the other hand, if Country 0 exports Good 1 and imports Good 2, then it will
do so only to and from Country 2. In this case (let us call it Case B), the prices of
Country 0 are equal to those in Country 2. There are no trade ows between Country
0 and Country 1.
Similarly, under Assumption I and Assumption IIB, the tari¤s on imports are
identical wherever the import originates, and the gross incidence of tari¤s through
an intermediate country (transient port of entrepôt) is higher than that of the tari¤
from the original producer country. It is less costly for Country 0 to import Good 1
directly from Country 1 than to import Good 1 through Country 2 (Case A), or it is
less costly for Country 0 to import Good 2 directly from Country 2 than to import
Good 2 through Country 1 (Case B). Thus one can state:
Remark II. Under Assumptions I and IIB, if Country 0 exports Good 2 and
imports Good 1, then it will do so only to and from Country 1 (Case A). In this case,
the prices of Country 0 are equal to those in Country 2. There are no trade ows
between Country 0 and Country 2.
On the other hand, if Country 0 exports Good 1 and imports Good 2, then it will
do so only to and from Country 2 (Case B). In this case, the prices of Country 0
are equal to those in Country 1. There are no trade ows between Country 0 and
Country 1.
Unless the rest of the world is autarky, either of the above cases, Case A or
Case B, must apply in this two-good model under Assumption I and Assumption IIA
or IIB. Invoking Assumption III, we prove our following propositions assuming the
world in Case A, but our proof can be obtained exactly in the same way in Case B,
by interchanging the name of Country 1 with Country 2.
To repeat, our basic question is: what is the welfare e¤ect on the outsider country,
Country 0, of a PTA formation, that is, the mutually welcomed reduction of tari¤s
by Country 1 and Country 2, unaccompanied with any tari¤ reduction of the tari¤
on the product of Country 0? In other words, how discriminatory can a formation
of a PTA be towards the welfare of the rest of the world? We employ calculus for
developing our propositions, following the expenditure-revenue approach taken by,
for example, Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982), and Bhagwati, Brecher
and Hatta (1983, 1985). For the intuitive explanations, we provide an analysis of the
o¤er curve diagram.
The basic logic used in proving the various theorems on impossibility of the
Paretian e¢ cient PTA for the world is as follows. The proof goes as reductio ad
absurdum. We can assume because of the nature of mutual beneciary of a PTA that
the utility levels of both participating countries are increased. Then assume, on the
contrary, the welfare level of the rest of the world were increased. Then, appealing
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to the normality of goods, we prove that one of the market equilibrium would not be
attained, leading to contradiction.
Let Sk(pk; uk) (k = 0; 1; 2); pk = (pk1; p
k
2); be the absorption function, that is, the
algebraic di¤erence between the expenditure function Ek(pk; uk) to keep the utility
level of uk and the revenue function F k(pk). Behind these functions lie basic utility
functions u0(C01 ; C
0
2), u
1(C11 ; C
1
2), and u
2(C21 ; C
2
2) as the utility levels of Countries 0, 1,
and 2, respectively. Utilities are dened on their consumption bundles Ckj s, where C
k
j
(j = 1; 2; k = 0; 1; 2) indicates consumption of Good j by Country k. pk = (pk1; p
k
2)
(k = 0; 1; 2) is the price vector that prevails in the home market in Country k.
Dene the international price vector that Country 0 faces as p = (p1; p

2), the ratio
of whose two components of the price vector indicates the terms of trade given to
the country. In the trade pattern of Case A, and under Assumption IIA, namely
in the absence of tari¤s regarding the import or the export of the rest of the world,
(p1; p

2) = (p
0
1; p
0
2) = (p
1
1; p
1
2): In the trade pattern of Case A, and under Assumption
IIB (the MFN initial state), (p1; p

2) = (p
0
1   t101 ; p02) is the price vector that Country
0 faces in the international market.
Let us start our main analysis of the revenue-expenditure system, taking Case
A as the trade pattern with Assumption IIA. Here, Country 0 and Country 1 share
a common price vector. We can take the price vector prevailing in Country 0 and
Country 1 as the international vector p = (p1; p

2):
Given international price vector p and tari¤ vector tk, the following equation is
satised.
E0(p0; u0)  F 0(p0)  S0(p0; u0) = 0; (1)
E1(p1; u1)  F 1(p1) + t212 [E22(p2; u2)  F 22 (p2)]
 S1(p1; u1) + t212 S22(p2; u2) = 0; (2)
E2(p2; u2)  F 2(p2)  t121 [E21(p2; u2)  F 21 (p2)]
 S2(p2; u2)  t121 S21(p2; u2) = 0; (3)
where Eku  @Ek=@uk  @Sk=@uk; F kj  @F k=@pkj ; and Skj  @Sk=@pkj . Skj  Ekj  F kj
is the excess demand for Good j by Country k. In view of the trade pattern of Case
A, we write the system in terms of the international price vector (p1; p

2). Moreover,
we take the international price of Good 1 as numéraire so that p1  1, and denote the
terms of trade of Country 1 as p2  p2=p1. From Figure 1A, and using Assumption
IIA, one can see that (1; p2) = (1; p
0
2) = (1; p
1
2), and (p
2
1; p
2
2) = (1+ t
12
1 ; p

2  t212 ). Then
this system can be written as:
S0(1; p2; u
0) = 0; (4)
S1(1; p2; u
1) + t212 S
2
2(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (5)
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S2(1 + t121 ; p

2   t212 ; u2)  t121 S21(1 + t121 ; p2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (6)
Equations (4), (5) and (6) are the three basic budget constraints for the countries
in the world. In addition, we have the two market clearing equations to complete
the system. Note that the partial derivative of the absorption function of a country
with respect to the domestic price of good j is the excess demand for good j of the
country. For example, S21  S21(1+ t121 ; p2  t212 ; u2) is the excess demand (net import)
for Good 1 by Country 2. In light of the Walras law, one of the following equations
is redundant because it is implied by the other equations.
S01(1; p

2; u
0) + S11(1; p

2; u
1) + S21(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (7)
S02(1; p

2; u
0) + S12(1; p

2; u
1) + S22(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0: (8)
We add some additional preliminary remarks. From the zero homogeneity of the
excess demand, that is, Ski; (k = 0; 1; 2, i; j = 1; 2), in terms of the domestic prices,
we have by the Eulers theorem thatX
j=1;2
pkjS
k
ij = 0; i; j = 1; 2; k = 0; 1; 2; (9)
or,
X
j=1;2
pjS
k
ij = 0; k = 0; 1; i = 1; 2; (10)
(1 + t121 )S
2
i1 + (p

2   t212 )S2i2 = 0; i = 1; 2: (11)
Also from the linear homogeneity of the expenditure function in terms of domestic
prices, we have
Eku =
X
j=1;2
pkjE
k
uj =
X
j=1;2
pjE
k
uj k = 0; 1; (12)
E2u =
X
j=1;2
p2jE
2
uj = (1 + t
12
1 )E
2
u1 + (p

2   t212 )E2u2; (13)
where Ekuj  @Ekj =@uk. Of course, we are assuming that p1 = 1 wherever applicable
in the above expressions. We assume Case A in the following analysis so that the
trade pattern is described as
S01 > 0, S
1
1 < 0, S
2
1 > 0, S
1
1 + S
2
1 < 0, (14)
S02 < 0, S
1
2 > 0, S
2
2 < 0, S
1
2 + S
2
2 > 0. (15)
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We di¤erentiate totally equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) in terms of du0; du1; du2; dp2;
and policy instruments dt121 and dt
21
2 . Then, we obtain our basic system of compara-
tive statics by eliminating the equilibrium condition of good 2 by the Walras law.2664
E0u 0 0 S
0
2 0 0
0 E1u t
21
2 E
2
u2 S
1
2 + t
21
2 S
2
22 t
21
2 S
2
21 S
2
2   t212 S222
0 0 E2u   t121 E2u1 S22   t121 S212  t121 S211  S22 + t121 S212
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1
P
k S
k
12 S
2
11  S212
3775
26666664
du0
du1
du2
dp2
dt121
dt212
37777775 = 0: (16)
In their well known paper, Kemp andWan (1976) showed that if the external price
vectors, that is, dp2 remain constant, the welfare of the neighbor remains constant
while the memberswelfare is improved. Though their objective is di¤erent from ours
in that we aim to show the di¢ culty of attaining the Pareto improving PTA without
explicit concessions to the rest of the world, their analytical device has turned out to
be extremely useful. In the following, we will dene a combination of tari¤ changes
that keeps the terms of trade constant and call the state of unchanged terms of trade
as the "External Terms of Trade Preserving" (ETTP) state, a concept used in the
proof of the Kemp-Wan theorem.
Proposition IA: Under Assumptions I, IIA, and III, it is impossible to keep the ex-
ternal price vector constant (ETTP state) if the reciprocal reductions of tari¤s between
member countries 1 and 2 are mutually benecial to the member countries.
Proof: Assume the contrary, that there exists a mutually benecial state, recip-
rocal reductions of tari¤s between Country 1 and country 2, that satises dp2 = 0.
It su¢ ces to show that dp2 = 0 is not compatible to the improving utility levels for
country 1 and country 2. The system (16) is then simplied to
2664
E0u 0 0 0 0
0 E1u t
21
2 E
2
u2 t
21
2 S
2
21 S
2
2   t212 S222
0 0 E2u   t121 E2u1  t121 S211  S22 + t121 S212
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1 S
2
11  S212
3775
266664
du0
du1
du2
dt121
dt212
377775 = 0: (17)
The last equation in this system (17) implies:X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k + S211dt
12
1   S212dt212 = 0: (18)
9
However, one can easily show that the left hand side (L.H.S.) of the equation (18) is
positive. For, (i) by the assumption of mutually benecial state3, the terms involving
duk is positive, (ii) S211 is negative and, S
2
12 is positive by the substitutes assumption.
Finally (iii) both dt121 and dt
21
2 are negative. Therfore, the last two expressions are
positive, and (18) cannot hold. That is a contradiction to our assumption that the
market clears with the constant external price vector. QED.
One can prove this in the same way in Case B as well, by exchanging the naming
of countries between Country 1 and Country 2, and of goods between Good 1 and
Good 2.
We have shown that as long as both goods are normal (Assumption III), then
there will be no mutual concession of tari¤s that keeps the terms of trade to the
rest of the world constant, or realize the ETTP state. Proposition I implies that the
ETTP state cannot be achievable by any combination of mutual benecial concession
of tari¤s by members of a PTA.
<Figure 2 comes here>
This proposition can be explained intuitively by an o¤er curve diagram (Figure
2). In Figure 2, the o¤er curve of Country 0 in terms of the international price vector,
(1; p2), or the international terms of trade facing Country 0, p

2, is drawn under the
assumption of Case A. This terms of trade happens to be the common price vector
between Country 0 and Country 1 in this case, and is drawn with the combined o¤er
curve of Countries 1 and 2. The initial equilibrium is at P and the international terms
of trade prevailing over Country 0 is expressed by the slopes of OP as indicated there.
The atter the slope of OP, the better is the welfare of Country 0. Even after mutual
tari¤ reductions by member countries, Country 0s o¤er curve remains the same and
goes through point P. Suppose the changes in tari¤s keep the international terms
of trade constant as OP. Since the mutual concession in tari¤s improves incomes of
Countries 1 and 2, the combined o¤er curve of Country 1 and Country 2 will move
upward, because of the (normal goods) income e¤ects of enhanced utility levels of the
members. Accordingly, the intersection of the o¤er curves will never remain at P.
The proof of Proposition IA shows that, as long as income e¤ects are positive,
the same external terms of trade creates the excess demand of Good 1 as indicated
in the Figure 2. This suggests that the international terms of trade p2 should be
lower in the equilibrium and should hurt the welfare of Country 0. The proof of the
next proposition in fact demonstrates the validity of this geometrical intuition. One
can see the importance of the assumption that the formation of a PTA is mutually
benecial for Country 1 and Country 2 because the proof depends on the fact the
income e¤ects for both commodities are positive.
3Needless to say, the welfare level of Country 0s utility level does not change because it is in the
ETTP state
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Even in the case when the terms of trade adjust, we have the following proposition
for the case covering variable external terms of trade.
Proposition IIA: Under Assumptions I, IIA, and III, there will be no mutual con-
cessions of tari¤s that will improve the welfare of the world in the Paretian sense.
Proof: Assume the contrary that a Pareto improving PTA exists that enhances
at least the welfare of one country in the world and keeps the welfare of the other
countries constant. Then to keep the welfare of the rest of the world, the international
terms of trade facing Country 1 should remain constant or increase, that is,
dp2  0 (19)
The last equation of the system (16)X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k +
X
k=0;1;2
Sk12dp

2 + S
2
11dt
12
1   S212dt212 = 0; (20)
must hold by our hypothesis.
On the other hand, since each countrys utility does not decrease (duk  0 for
k = 0; 1; 2) after the reciprocal tari¤ reduction between Countries 1 and 2, the rst
term of the equation remains nonnegative.X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k > 0; (21)
Since in the two-good world the goods are always substitutes, Sk12 is positive for
k = 0:1:2: Accordingly, the second term of the above equations,X
k=0;1;2
Sk12dp

2 = 0 (22)
Finally, the third and forth terms of the L.H.S. of equation (20) is, because dt121 < 0
and dt212 < 0,
S211dt
12
1   S212dt212 > 0 (23)
Inequalities imply that equation (20) cannot be satised with equality. This contra-
dicts our initial hypothesis. QED.
Next, we will study Case A under the Assumption IIB, where the MFN principle
is observed initially and the trade pattern is illustrated by Figure 1A. If the tari¤ re-
duction is conducted discriminatingly against the non-member country, then a similar
analysis follows the analysis that led to Proposition I and Proposition II.
Suppose that the MFN principle is observed initially, but that in the formation
of a PTA the member countries neglect the appropriate concession to the rest of the
11
world. Keeping the notation of the international vector as (1; p2), one can see in this
case,
(p01; p
0
2) = (1 + t
10
1 ; p

2); (24)
(p11; p
1
2) = (1; p

2 + t
01
2 ) = (1; p
2
2 + t
21
2 ); (25)
(p21; p
2
2) = (1 + t
12
1 ; p
2
2) = (1 + t
12
1 ; p

2 + t
01
2   t212 ): (26)
Please note that before the reciprocal reductions of tari¤s between member coun-
tries 1 and 2, t012 = t
21
2 and therefore p
2
2 = p

2 from the MFN principle. After the
preferential tari¤ reductions by member countries, however, t012 > t
21
2 and therefore
p22 = p

2 + t
01
2   t212 > p2. Then this system can be written as:
S0(1 + t101 ; p

2; u
0)  t101 S01(1 + t101 ; p2; u0) = 0; (27)
S1(1; p2 + t
01
2 ; u
1) + t012 S
0
2(1 + t
10
1 ; p

2; u
1) + t212 S
2
2(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2 + t
01
2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (28)
S2(1 + t121 ; p

2 + t
01
2   t212 ; u2)  t121 S21(1 + t121 ; p2 + t012   t212 ; u2) = 0: (29)
Equations (27), (28), and (29) are the three basic budget constraints for the
countries in the world. In addition, we have the two-market clearing equations to
complete the system.
S01(1 + t
10
1 ; p

2; u
0) + S11(1; p

2 + t
01
2 ; u
1) + S21(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2 + t
01
2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (30)
S02(1 + t
10
1 ; p

2; u
0) + S12(1; p

2 + t
01
2 ; u
1) + S22(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2 + t
01
2   t212 ; u2) = 0: (31)
By total di¤erentiation in terms of du0; du1; du2; dp2; and policy instruments dt
12
1
and dt212 ,
266664
E0u   t101 E0u1 0 0 S02   t101 S012 0 0
0 E1u   t12E1u2 0 S12 + t012 S022 + t212 S222 t212 S221 S22   t212 S222
0 0 E2u   t121 E2u1 S22   t121 S212  t121 S211  S21 + t121 S212
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1
P
k S
k
12 S
2
11  S212
E0u2 E
1
u2 E
2
u2
P
k S
k
22 S
2
21  S222
377775
26666664
du0
du1
du2
dp2
dt121
dt212
37777775 = 0: (32)
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It is easy to see from (32) that the proof of Propositions IA and IIA apply even
though there are some initial tari¤s on the export and the import of the rest of the
world as long as that does not change the trading pattern depicted in Figure 1A (or
Figure 1B). The only important assumption is that tari¤s related to the export and
the import of Country 0 remain the same.
Proposition IB: Under Assumptions I, IIB, and III, it is impossible to keep the ex-
ternal price vector constant (ETTP state) if the reciprocal reductions of tari¤s between
member countries 1 and 2 are mutually benecial to the member countries.
Proposition IIB: Under Assumptions I, IIB, and III, there will be no mutual con-
cessions of tari¤s that will improve the welfare of the world in the Paretian sense.
Proof: It would su¢ ce to prove Proposition IIB.
Assume the contrary. The market clearing condition of Good 1 in the system (32)
is the same as equation (20), that is,X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k +
X
k=0;1;2
Sk12dp

2 + S
2
11dt
12
1   S212dt212 = 0 (33)
As long as each countrys utility does not decrease (duk  0 for k = 0; 1; 2) after the
reciprocal tari¤ reduction (i.e., dt121 < 0 and dt
21
2 < 0,) between Countries 1 and 2,
inequality (21) applies. Also inequalities (22) and (23) hold. These inequalities lead
to a contradiction to equation (33). QED.
Thus, as long as Case A (or Case B) holds for the trade pattern, the welfare e¤ect
of a PTA on the rest of the world is generally detrimental without compensating
compensation to the rest of the world. In some cases, however, the trade pattern may
be drastically di¤erent from the above in the presence of high tari¤s or transportation
costs among countries. We will turn to one of such cases, namely, the case with an
"entrepôt" country as a member of a PTA.
4 The Case of Entrepôt
In this model, an "entrepôt" is a country that imports a good from a neighbor coun-
try and re-exports at least a part of the same good to another country. There are
multiple dimensions of an entrepôt, or a transient port, which started the attention
of economists (e.g. Feenstra et. al., 1999, and Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). In our
pure model of trade, we focus on the simple but basic feature of an entrepôt, namely,
directions of trade through an entrepôt.
Suppose now that there is an entrepôt in the member countries of a PTA as
indicated by Figure 1C. In the absence of transportation cost and in the absence of
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tari¤s on the import or the export of Country 0, we have ascertained that this would
not happen as a trade pattern of the world. But if there is a heavy transportation
cost between Country 0 and Country 24, or if there is a heavy taxation on the import
and/or the export between Country 0 and Country 25, Country 1 may emerge as an
entrepôt. For the generality of discussions, we allow in this case with entrepôt an
import tax of Country 0, t102 .
For example, let us assume Country 1 is an entropôt whose trade pattern is drawn
in Figure 1C.
<Figure 1C comes here>
Then, one can state:
Proposition III: Suppose that a member country of a PTA is an "entrepôt" de-
scribed by the trade ows in Figure 1C. If all the goods are normal (Assumption III),
then there is no ETTP state that is compatible with the mutually benecial PTA of
the member countries.
Proof: In this case, the direction of trade between Country 0 and Country 1 is
completely reversed from the Case A.
S01 < 0, S
1
1 + S
2
1 > 0, (34)
S02 > 0, S
1
2 + S
2
2 < 0. (35)
Thus the decrease in price of Good 2 is now benecial (rather than harmful) to Coun-
try 0. Then the budget constraints of the countries are written as:
S0(1; p2 + t
10
2 ; u
0)  t102 S02(1; p2 + t102 ; u0) = 0; (36)
S1(1 + t011 ; p

2; u
1) + t011 S
0
1(1; p

2 + t
10
2 ; u
0) + t212 S
2
2(1 + t
01
1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (37)
S2(1 + t011 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2)  t121 S21(1 + t011 + t121 ; p2   t212 ; u2) = 0: (38)
The system concludes with the market clearing conditions for two commodities where
the excess demand functions Ski s are properly specied.
S01(1; p

2 + t
10
2 ; u
0) + S11(1 + t
01
1 ; p

2; u
1) + S21(1 + t
01
1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0; (39)
S02(1; p

2 + t
10
2 ; u
0) + S12(1 + t
01
1 ; p

2; u
1) + S22(1 + t
01
1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) = 0: (40)
4If a country has an excellent port or build an excellent facilities, then it may develop an entrepot.
In particular, the existence of indivisibility in transport and resulting increasing returns are the
crucial reasons for the emergence of a transient port. In our model, we take the trade pattern
through the entropôt as given and analyze its implications.
5In absence of transportation cost, the condition t212 + t
10
2 < t
20
2 or t
01
1 + t
12
1 < t
02
1 makes Country
1 an entrepôt. This does not occur when the MFN principle is initially observed.
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Then consider that the market equilibrium condition of Good 1 in its total di¤eren-
tiation form will become at the ETTP state (dp2 = 0),X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k + S211dt
12
1   S212dt212 = 0 (41)
With these preparations, assume the contrary to the conclusion of Proposition III.
Then, the ETTP state dp2 = 0 coexists with the improvement of utilities of member
countries: duk  0 for k = 1; 2 after the reciprocal tari¤ reduction between Countries
1 and 2: Since dp2 = 0; du
0 = 0; the rst term of the equation remains nonnegative.X
k=0;1;2
Eku1du
k =
X
k=1;2
Eku1du
k > 0; (42)
Finally, the second and third terms of the L.H.S. of equation (41) is signed as,
S211dt
12
1   S212dt212 > 0 (43)
Inequalities imply that equation (41) cannot be satised with equality. This contra-
dicts our initial assumption. QED.
This is a good news for the world, however. This proof of Proposition III implies
that, if we keep the external terms of trade, the market of Good 1 is in excess demand.
If the goods market is stable, the equilibrium relative price of Good 1 will increase,
or the terms of trade p2 will decline. This can be seen intuitively from a diagram of
the o¤er curves like Figure 2. If there is excess demand for Good 1, the equilibrium
price ratio will be in favor of Good 1. Since Country 0 exports Good 1 instead of 2 in
this entrepôt case, this is a blessing to the rest of the world, provided that the level
of tari¤ is su¢ ciently small in the presence of an entrepôt.
In order to state Proposition IV, we posit the following stability assumption for
the market.
Assumption IV: The goods market is (Walrasian) stable.
Then, one can state:
Proposition IV: Suppose that a member country of a PTA is an "entrepôt" de-
scribed by the trade ows in Case C. Under Assumption III and IV, a creation of
a PTA that is mutually benecial to member countries would denitely enhance the
welfare of the rest of the world.
Proof: Since the reciprocal tari¤ reduction is mutually benecial, by Proposition
III the unchanged external terms of trade (dp2 = 0) would keep the market of Good 1
in excess demand. By the stability of the market (Assumption IV), this implies that
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the change in the equilibrium relative price of Good 2 from the initial price would be
in a negative direction, that is, dp2 < 0:
By the total di¤erentiation of equation (36),
(E0u   t102 E0u2)du0 + (S02   t102 S022)dp2 = 0;
or,
(E0u   t102 E0u2)du0 =  (S02   t102 S022)dp2 (44)
On the other hand, because of the linear homogeneity of the expenditure function,
by Eulers theorem, E0u   (p2 + t102 )E0u2 > 0, and accordingly E0u   t102 E0u2 > 0. Also,
S02 > 0 and S
0
22 < 0, so that S
0
2   t102 S022 > 0. Therefore, the R.H.S. of the equation
is positive if dp2 < 0;and we nally obtain du
0 > 0. QED
One may provide the following intuitive interpretation of this result. The entrepôt
country serves as if it were a semiconductor that connects trade ows. If a PTA is
formed around the entrepot, then all the world will be beneted by the more e¢ cient
ows of trade through the entrepôt.
Moreover, one can state:
Proposition V: The above results from Proposition I through IV hold even if an
intra-member transfer is allowed between Country 1 and Country 2.
We will illustrate its proof in the case of Proposition I. Now the budget constraints
of Country 1 and Country 2 become after a transfer from Country 1 to Country 2,
T 12:
S1(1; p2; u
1) + t212 S
2
2(1 + t
12
1 ; p

2   t212 ; u2) + T 12 = 0; (45)
S2(1 + t121 ; p

2   t212 ; u2)  t121 S21(1 + t121 ; p2   t212 ; u2)  T 12 = 0: (46)
The system in terms of incremental variables is:
2664
E0u 0 0 0 0 0
0 E1u t
21
2 E
2
u2 t
21
2 S
2
21 S
2
2   t212 S222 1
0 0 E2u   t121 E2u1  t121 S211  S22 + t121 S212  1
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1 S
2
11  S212 0
3775
26666664
du0
du1
du2
dt121
dt212
dT 12
37777775 = 0: (47)
This does not a¤ect any logical procedures to derive the excess demand for Good 1.
Other Propositions can be proved in the same way. Needless to say, the transfer to
(or from) Country 0 will denitely help the creation of the Pareto e¢ cient PTA for
the world. Certainly transfer to and from the rest of the world does not change the
impossibility of the ETTP state, but do directly a¤ect the utility level of Country 0.
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5 Multiple-good, Multiple-country Case
Let us generalize our discussions to the N-good model with many country case. By
adopting the Armington Assumption that a good is exported by a single country
and not re-exported as the same good, we can generalize the above to many-good,
many-country case. An important restriction to the analysis is that the rest of the
world must be a single country, because it is di¢ cult to make welfare judgment on
the rest of the world consisting of many countries.
In order not to overburden the readers with complicated notations, we will proceed
to analyze the system of three good and three-country case. Each country exports a
single good, and imports two kinds of goods from abroad. Two countries, Country 1
and Country 2 engage in mutually benecial tari¤ negotiations to build a PTA. The
results to be obtained below can be generalized to any number of member countries
in a PTA, and, in particular, to any number of commodities as long as we keep the
following Armington assumption.
Throughout the analysis, we assume the following Armington assumption that
each commodity is exported by only one country. In a practical domain, this is
an assumption that is compatible with the rules of origin under the GATT (see
Panagariya and Krishna, 2002). Jamaican co¤ee is distinguished from Colombian
co¤ee as a di¤erent commodity under the "rules of origin," and Jamaican co¤ee re-
exported through Panama is still Jamaican co¤ee, a distinct commodity from both
Colombian and Panamanian co¤ee.
Country k (k = 0; 1; 2) exports Good k to two other countries. Country 1, im-
porter of Good 2 and Good 0, and Country 2, importer of Good 1 and Good 0, form
a PTA, and Country 0 that imports Good 1 and Good 2 is the rest-of-the-world
country that will be left behind from the PTA. The specic tari¤ rate imposed on the
product of Country j by Country k is denoted by tkj .
6 At the initial point, Country 1
imposes a tari¤ t10 on its import from Country 0 (Good 0) and a tari¤ t
1
2 on its import
from Country 2 (Good 2). Country 2 imposes a tari¤ t20 on its import from Country
0, tari¤ t21 on its import from Country 1. Similarly, Country 0 imposes a tari¤ t
0
1 on
its import of Good 1 and t02 on import of Good 2. A PTA is formed when Country 1
and Country 2 agree to reduce their tari¤ rates reciprocally. In the following analysis,
for simplicity of exposition, t21 and t
1
2 are the only policy variables and other t
k
js that
involve Country 0 as an exporter or an importer  either j or k is 0  are assumed
to be zero.
Let u0(C00 ; C
0
1 ; C
0
2), u
1(C10 ; C
1
1 ; C
1
2), and u
2(C20 ; C
2
1 ; C
2
2) be the utility levels of
Countries 0, 1, and 2 dened on their consumption bundles Ckj s, where C
k
j (j =
0; 1; 2; k = 0; 1; 2) indicates consumption of Good j by Country k. pk = (pk0; p
k
1; p
k
2)
(k = 0; 1; 2) is the price vector that prevails in the home market in Country k. Dene
international price vector p  (p00; p11; p22) that is the vector of prices at the ports of
6We dont need a double superscript to indicate the exporter and importer since Good j comes
only from Country j.
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origin, and by construction (p10; p
1
1; p
1
2) = (p
0
0; p
1
1; p
2
2+ t
1
2), (p
2
0; p
2
1; p
2
2) = (p
0
0; p
1
1+ t
2
1; p
2
2),
and (p00; p
0
1; p
0
2) = (p
0
0; p
1
1; p
2
2) = p
.
Given international price vector p and tari¤ vector tk, the following equation is
satised, where t0 = (0; 0; 0), t1 = (0; 0; t12), t
2 = (0; t21; 0), and S
k
j is the import of
Good j into Country k. Three budget constraints for Countries 0, 1, and 2 are
S0(p; u0) = 0; (48)
S1(p + t1; u1)  t12S12(p + t1; u1) = 0; (49)
S2(p + t2; u2)  t21S21(p + t2; u2) = 0: (50)
The equilibrium conditions in the world market for the commodities are as follows.
By the Walras law, one of the three is redundant in that it is automatically satised
if the other two are satised.7
S00 + S
1
0 + S
2
0 = 0; (51)
S01 + S
1
1 + S
2
1 = 0; (52)
S02 + S
1
2 + S
2
2 = 0: (53)
Let us designate the international price of Good 0 as the numeraire and let p0  1,
and dp0  0. By total di¤erentiation in terms of du0, du1, du2, dp1, dp2, and policy
instruments t21 and t
1
2,26666664
E0u 0 0 S
0
1 S
0
2 0 0
0 E1u   t12E1u2 0 S11   t12S121 S12   t12S122 0  t12S122
0 0 E2u   t21E2u1 S21   t21S211 S22   t21S212  t21S211 0
E0u0 E
1
u0 E
2
u0
P
k S
k
01
P
k S
k
02 S
2
01 S
1
02
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1
P
k S
k
11
P
k S
k
12 S
2
11 S
1
12
E0u2 E
1
u2 E
2
u2
P
k S
k
21
P
k S
k
22 S
2
21 S
1
22
37777775
2666666664
du0
du1
du2
dp1
dp2
dt21
dt12
3777777775
= 0 (54)
From the zeroth homogeneity of the excess demand, that is, Skj , in terms of the
domestic prices, we have by Eulers theorem thatX
j=0;1;2
pkjS
k
ij =
X
j=0;1;2
(pj + t
k
j )S
k
ij = 0; k = 0; 1; 2; i; j = 0; 1; 2; (55)
7Still, it is important to note in the following analysis that all of them are always satised.
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where pj is the export price of Good j from Country j, that is, the jth component
of the international vector, and tkj is identically zero for j = k by the Armington
assumption. Also from the linear homogeneity of the expenditure function in terms
of domestic prices, we have
Eku =
X
j=0;1;2
pkjE
k
uj =
X
j=0;1;2
(pj + t
k
j )E
k
uj, k = 0; 1; 2: (56)
We will assume:
Assumption V: All goods are mutually substitutes.
Assumption VI: All the levels of tari¤s are su¢ ciently small.
Now we will show that the ETTP state is incompatible with the mutually bene-
cial tari¤ concessions between the members of a PTA, namely between Countries 1
and 2.
Proposition VI: Under Assumptions III, V and VI, there will be no external terms
of trade preserving (ETTP) tari¤ reductions that are mutually benecial to member
countries, regardless whether transfer payments are allowed between member coun-
tries.
Proof: Assume the contrary that there were to exist an equilibrium with dp1 =
dp2 = 0 that is compatible with (du1; du2)  0. First, let us note what the system
of equations in case of absence of transfers becomes by eliminating the equilibrium
condition for Good 0,266664
E0u 0 0 0 0
0 E1u   t12E1u2 0 0  t12S122
0 0 E2u   t21E2u1  t21S211 0
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1 S
2
11 S
1
12
E0u2 E
1
u2 E
2
u2 S
2
21 S
1
22
377775
266664
du0
du1
du2
dt21
dt12
377775 = 0: (57)
does not have any non-trivial solution if the 5 by 5 matrix is non-singular. Therefore
the proposition is trivially true.
To make the problem more realistic, we allowed in the statement of the proposition
that transfers are possible between members. The system is written
266664
E0u 0 0 0 0 0
0 E1u   t12E1u2 0 0  t12S122 1
0 0 E2u   t21E2u1  t21S211 0  1
E0u1 E
1
u1 E
2
u1 S
2
11 S
1
12 0
E0u2 E
1
u2 E
2
u2 S
2
21 S
1
22 0
377775
26666664
du0
du1
du2
dt21
dt12
dT 12
37777775 = 0: (58)
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Then by hypothesis, there is an equilibrium with tari¤ changes that preserves the
external terms of trade. Multiply the last two equations of the system by p1; and p

2
and add together. It follows thatX
k=0;1;2
(p1E
k
u1 + p

2E
k
u2)du
k + (p1S
2
11 + p

2S
2
21)dt
2
1 + (p

1S
1
12 + p

2S
1
22)dt
1
2 = 0: (59)
From the zeroth homogeneity of the excess demand functions Skj , this is rewritten,
noting p0 = 1,X
k=0;1;2
(p1E
k
u1 + p

2E
k
u2)du
k   (S201 + t21S211)dt21   (S102 + t12S122)dt12 = 0: (60)
From the assumption of benecail mutual tax reduction, du0s are nonnnegative, and
0   dt21 dt12 . Also the su¢ ciently small tari¤ levels (Assumption VI) ensures that
S201 + t
2
1S
2
11 S
1
02 + t
1
2S
1
22
  0: Accordingly, the right hand side of the equation is
the sum of the positive three terms. This is a contradiction to equation (60). QED.89
A natural question is if it is possible to form a Pareto improving PTA when the
terms of trade to the rest of the world is variable.
Proposition VII: Under Assumptions V and VI, there will be no mutual reductions
of tari¤s that are Pareto benecial to the world in the absence of any concessions to
neighbors.
Proof: There are four kinds of directions for the international prices to move,
assuming by convention that the numéraire price does not change, i.e., dp0 = 0.
Case (i) (dp1; dp

2)  0:
Case (ii) (dp1; dp

2) = 0:
Case (iii) One of the pair (dp1; dp

2) is positive and the other is negative: dp

1 < 0
and dp2 > 0; or dp

1 > 0 and dp

2 < 0:
Case (iv) (dp1; dp

2)  0:
We consider these four cases in turn.
Case (i): This is a typical direction that prices are likely to move. It is realized
when the excess demand structures on goods by the three countries are similar (Endoh
and Hamada, 2005). Since Country 0 imports Good 1 and Good 2, this move cannot
be Pareto improving. The Proposition holds true in this case.
8The proposition is in conformity with the Kemp-Wan theorem, because the Kemp-Wan theorem
assumes an instrument, common tari¤s towards the rest of the world, as a means of keeping the
terms of trade. We are in fact reconrming that the tari¤ concessions to non-member countries are
necessary for the attainment of the ETTP state, a state which was skillfully employed to prove the
Kemp-Wan Theorem.
9This result can be also proved by applying the Farkas Theorem (Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow,
1958).
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Case (ii): Proposition VI indicates that this Proposition holds true for this case.
Case (iii): We will also prove the impossibility of a Pareto improving PTA forma-
tion when dp1 < 0 and dp

2 > 0.
Assume the contrary, that there is a Pareto improving PTA formation, S01dp

1 +
S02dp

2  0 follows in order not to deteriorate the welfare of Country 0.
On the other hand, since the levels of tari¤s are su¢ ciently small, and since neither
the import of Good 1 to Country 2 nor the import of Good 2 to Country 1 is zero,
then the signs of components of the matrix in the L.H.S. of equation (54)
S11   t12S121 S12   t12S122
S21   t21S211 S22   t21S212

must be the same as those of Skj s, because of the assumption of su¢ ciently small
initial tari¤ levels. That is,
sign

S11   t12S121 S12   t12S122
S21   t21S211 S22   t21S212

= sign

S11 S
1
2
S21 S
2
2

=
   +
+  

: (61)
We have to note that the welfare of Country 2 importing Good 1 will increase when
dp1 < 0 and dp

2 > 0. The welfare of Country 1, however, will denitely deteriorate.
This contradicts the successful formation of a mutually benecial PTA. (Incidentally,
the above conditions for the magnitudes of tari¤s are equivalent to the conditions
that the tari¤ levels are set to below the revenue maximizing tari¤ levels.) Those
terms involving t12 or t
2
1 have all negative signs, but for su¢ ciently small t
1
2 and t
2
1,
the e¤ect of those terms will be negligible. Thus we obtain the contradiction.
Case (iv): Multiply the last two equations of the system (54) by p1 and p

2 and
add up. From the zeroth homogeneity of Skj , this is rewritten, assuming p

0 = 1
and dp0 = 0,
X
k=0;1;2
(p1E
k
u1 + p

2E
k
u2)du
k  
 X
k=0;1;2
Sk01 + t
1
2S
1
21 + t
2
1S
2
11
!
dp1
 
 X
k=0;1;2
Sk02 + t
1
2S
1
22 + t
2
1S
2
12
!
dp2   (S201 + t21S211)dt21   (S102 + t12S122)dt12 = 0 (62)
From the assumption of mutual tax reduction, 0  (dt12; dt21) and the assumption
of su¢ ciently small tkj implies that all the e¤ect of t
0s in the above expression is
dominated by the e¤ects of Sk0j (j = 1; 2; k = 0; 1; 2): Along with the hypothesis
(dp1; dp

2)  0 implies that the L.H.S. of the equation is positive as long as goods are
substitutes. This leads us to a contradiction. QED.
Curiously, in the case of the existence of complimentarily of the numéraire good,
one can also show:
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Proposition VIII: If the numéraire good, Good 0, is complementary to the other
two traded goods, then, regardless of the levels of initial tari¤s, there will be no tari¤
reductions by member countries that keep the outside terms of trade constant, namely,
that would attain the TTPS.
Proof: Take a row vector (1; 1; 1; p1; p2) and multiply equation (57) by the
vector from the left. Then, by similar calculations of the above, one obtains from the
equation that it must hold if the system is valid.

E0u0 E
1
u0 E
2
u0
 24 du0du1
du2
35+  S201 S102   dt21dt12

= 0: (63)
The rst term of the left hand side is denitely positive, and the second term is
positive by our assumption of complements of Good 0 to the other goods in the two
countries, (S201; S
1
02) < 0 and (dt
1
2; dt
2
1)  0: This will lead to a contradiction. QED.10
This implies that the ETTP will generate the excess supply for combined Goods 1
and 2 when the budget constraints are all satised. Therefore, the excess demand for
Good 0, the export of the rest of the world, will be increased. This suggests, under
the assumption of market stability (Assumption V), that we may nd the possibility
of a Pareto improving PTA in the world. If the commerce between Countries 1 and
2 is encouraged by a PTA, when the export of Country 0 is a strong complement
to both of Good 1 and Good 2, then a PTA between Country 1 and Country 2 will
generate export boom for the rest of the world, that is, Country 0.
Except Proposition VIII, all the proposition in this section could be proved if
there are more than two countries to join a mutually benecial trade agreement, and
if each country produces and export more than one product. The only requirement is
that in compatible to the Armington assumption, all the exports are not reexported
to other countries from the rst port that they arrive.
6 Impossibility of a Pareto-Improving PTA in the
World with Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan Cor-
rective Measures
It is well known that, if domestic distortions are corrected by tax-subsidy measures
as proposed by Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati, Ramaswami and
Srinivasan (1969) ("BRS scheme"), the only possibly remaining distortions are in
tari¤ managements. Therefore, in our notation,
10This is an application of the Farkas Theorem as well.
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Eidui = Si1dp

1 + S
i
2dp

2; i = 0; 1; 2: (64)
Equilibrium conditions in the world market for non-numeraire commodities are
S01 + S
1
1 + S
2
1 = 0; (65)
S02 + S
1
2 + S
1
2 = 0: (66)
If the FTA benets the member country, (du1, du2)  0 , which implies
E0du0 = S01dp

1 + S
0
2dp

2
=  (S11 + S21)dp1   (S12 + S22)dp2 =  E1du1   E2du2 < 0: (67)
Since E0 > 0, du0 < 0 . Thus, one can state the following proposition.
Proposition IX: In a Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan Economy where domestic
distortions are corrected by tax subsidy measures, there exists no Pareto-Improving
PTA without concessions to the rest of the world, regardless whether or not all the
goods are normal and regardless whether goods are mutually substitutes or comple-
ments.
In this world without domestic distortion, reductions in tari¤s do not contribute
to the e¢ ciency gains in the world economy.
7 Concluding Remarks
Using the expenditure-revenue function approach, this paper investigated what the
economic e¤ect would be on the welfare of the rest of the world if a PTA were formed
without making concessions to the rest of the world. In the two-commodity setting,
when goods are normal and none of the participants of a PTA is an entrepôt country,
the formation of a PTA is unable to keep the external terms of trade or to improve
the welfare of the rest of the world without tari¤ concessions to the rest of the world.
The opposite conclusion will hold, however, if the conguration of initial tari¤s or the
transportation cost facilitates the member of the PTA as an entrepôt or a transient
port. A formation with an entrepôt as a member always benets the neighbors of
the PTA in the two-good case. Thus, the prevalence of PTAs that involves entrepôts
like Singapore and Hong Kong, may be viewed as exemplary of the fact that the total
outcome of selsh economic behavior tends to choose an e¢ cient system. This may
be an example of policy development based on "what is realistic is rational."
In the three-good case, the ETTP state or the welfare improving PTA for the
world without tari¤ concessions to the rest of the world is impossible to attain, if
goods are mutually substitutes and if initial tari¤ levels are small.
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Our results give theoretical background for interpreting the empirical ndings
by Winters and Chang (2000), and Chang and Winters (2002), who observe the
deterioration of terms of trade to neighboring countries around PTAs. Also, these
results reinforce the argument by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) that emphasizes the
importance of the MFN principle as a means for keeping the welfare of the rest of
the world.
From the perspective of our analysis, Article XXIV of the GATT should be in-
terpreted much more strictly than is done at present because the welfare of the rest
of the world is likely to be hurt when a PTA is formed without proper tari¤ conces-
sions made to the outside countries. As far as the impact on the rest of the world
is concerned, the trade diversion e¤ect dominates the trade creation e¤ect. Aside
from the systemic "spaghetti bowl" problems accompanied by the "rules of origin,"
a formation of a PTA under the current interpretation of Article XXIV is a highly
unfair process to nonmember countries.11
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